Pingduo Market Value Beyond Baidu

Maybe more than 30 billion yuan is not the top, and more than 100 billion yuan is not a dream.
Shares of the Nasdaq Securities Code (PDD) surged 8.66% on Thursday, with a market capitalization of $39.1 billion, surpassing Baidu to become China’s fifth largest Internet listed company. Why can Pingduoduo rise? Can Baidu make a comeback? The following are the views of snowball users:
Snowball User@Dream Garden:

  1. Strive for more and eat the dividend of the sinking market.
    When the giants struggled for the new middle-class and high-consumption population in the first and second tier cities, they tried to find a new way and found a bigger market.
    Third-tier cities and rural areas cover 500-600 million netizens. They are all target users. They have low incomes and poor consumption capacity, but they are large enough. Moreover, the giant did not take into account this market, but also gave the fight more opportunities for development.
  2. Strive for more marketing excellence. In 2016, the acquisition cost of new users was 10 yuan per person and 17 yuan per person in 2017. According to the financial report, the number of active buyers in Pingduo reached 415 million in 2018, surpassing Baidu’s expectations.
    Snowball User@Fishing Honey-Zebei Rongzhi:
    I think it’s a good model for fighting too much. It has space and reason for survival. It’s very good from the business model. It’s also a neglected part of Ali and Jingdong. What’s more, it’s still a way from cheap to high quality, mostly in cultivating homemade labels, which can guarantee the quality, and the price can be low. If it succeeds, it’s only on the hillside now.
    For Baidu, search is still very good, but unfortunately only search, other attempts over the years have failed. In terms of AI and automatic driving, it may be Baidu’s only turning overtaking opportunity. AI seems to be the best in Baidu at present? Baidu’s advantage is that it still has a lot of money, a lot of money, and the cash cows it searches for are still very fat. The disadvantage may be the director himself. Baidu and Google in those days, the result is that now it is also sad.
    Snowball user @Manifest:
    Let’s start with Baidu.
    In BAT, apart from Ma Yun, Ma Huateng and Robin Li are both technical backgrounds. The quotation system developed by Robin Li is still applied by Wall Street today. They are all technicians. From the early development, Robin Li’s products do represent the highest level of China’s Internet in that era.
    From the commercial level, the “medical advertisement” service promoted by Robin Li in the past years has indeed brought considerable profits to Baidu. Although in recent years, it has shouldered tremendous pressure from public opinion, it does not affect the status of its search engine hegemony in essence. In China’s current Internet environment, there is no search engine that can compete with Baidu. Most of them still use Baidu while scolding Baidu.
    Regardless of public opinion, Baidu is a huge comprehensive contradiction from the perspective of capital. From the perspective of potential users, we can say: how many netizens are there in China, and how many potential users are there in Baidu. This is a very large base, but from the perspective of potential users and user development potential, Baidu is infinitely possible.
    However, from the perspective of “potential user conversion rate” or effective development rate, Baidu pays too much attention to search experience and “traffic” in the early stage, but does not pay attention to “user retention”. At that time, it firmly believed that as long as search can be relied on by all. When it entered the era of mobile Internet, it found that only BAT has the weakest development potential.
    It’s hard for you to turn a user who has long been used to the login-free search mode into a “search after login”. If you do that, you’ll be driving a lot of potential to other search engines (such as 360). So where is the breaking point? Baidu has thought of many ways:
    1) Content attraction (Baijianu, Baidu Tieba, Baidu Encyclopedia, Baidu Knows);
    2) Life service attraction (glutinous rice, Baidu take-out).
    As a result, everybody saw… When Baijia first appeared, some people really wanted to create content seriously, but later found that there are still “bidding ranking, SEO” and other search engine operations, which can not form a high-quality content ecology.
    In terms of life service, there is nothing wrong with sticky rice and Baidu takeaway in essence. So far, there are not many voices criticizing them. But why is it still dead? In fact, it has something to do with the “interest dispute” within Baidu. Having long been accustomed to the abundant cash flow provided by “competitive ranking, medical false advertisement”, this part of the people in the interior has gained a long-term “comfort zone”. Naturally, from budget to implementation, it gives priority to the “most stable and lucrative return” business. As a result, investment and construction in other industries are not very positive. From time to time, even hesitate and hesitate (after all, these businesses do not make money at first!).
    Is there any other way out besides selling oneself?
    Now, Baidu roars “ALL IN AI”, but it was mentioned a few years ago. Is ALL IN still in hand after so many years?